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Common Law Copyright, and Conversation
Frank J. Nawalanic*
A SSUME THAT "A" IS A WELL KNOWN AUTHOR and literary figure and
that "B" is an author in his own right, but far less known than "A".
"A" and "B" meet socially and engage in a stimulating conversation
wherein thoughts and ideas are freely expressed and conclusions drawn.
Sometime thereafter, "B" publishes excerpts from this conversation
and "A" strongly desires to prevent such from being published and
receiving publicity. To prevent publication of their conversation, "A"
could proceed against "B" under several different causes of action. He
could possibly allege breach of a fiduciary relationship, breach of im-
plied contract, invasion of privacy, unfair competition, or breach of
common law copyright. The last cause of action, common law copy-
right, is the subject of this paper.
Common law copyright is a phrase used to designate the property
rights in intellectual productions conferred by the common law.1 Com-
monly referred to as the "right of first publication," 2 it enables the au-
thor to exercise complete control over the first publication of his work.3
In this respect it is an absolute property right4 existing separately and
independently of federal copyright law.5
Conversation is defined as an exchange of observations, opinions
and ideas.0 It means familiar intercourse, an exchange of thoughts and
sentiments, 7 and implies mutuality." Two or more people must par-
ticipate and there must be an exchange of words.9
* B.M.E., Cleveland State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law; law clerk for a Cleveland law firm.
' 18 C.J.S., Copyright § 2 (1939).
2 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89
N.E. 2d 725 (1949).
3 Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y. 2d 341, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1969).
4 Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Werkmeister
v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
5 Congress is given authority under U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 to regulate all aspects of
copyright law. Congress has specifically declined to regulate common law copyright.
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author
or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent
and to obtain damages therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 2.
6 Webster's New International Dictionary (3rd ed. 1963).
7 In Re Fenton's Will, 97 Iowa 192, 66 N.W. 99 (1896).
8 Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N.E. 792 (1897).
9 United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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Elements of Common Law Copyright
One logical way to determine if conversation can be the subject
of common law copyright is to analyze the elements of common law
copyright in order to determine if conversation, as previously defined,
is applicable to each common law copyright element. This is not easily
done because the common law is an ever changing body of law, which
affects the subject matter constituting common law copyright.10 For
example, as noted above, common law copyright is a property right.'1
This right may be transferred in the same manner as any property
right 12 and, on death, common law copyright descends in the same
manner as personal property.13 Actions founded on common law copy-
rights sound in conversion. 14 In these respects, common law copyright
is like any other property right.
In early property law, for recovery of goods to be had under con-
version, the goods had to be identified by a proprietary mark.15 This
proprietary mark requirement must be maintained today under federal
copyright law to sustain an action for copyright infringement. 16 The
proprietary mark concept was applied to common law copyright. The
copyright had to be in a tangible form, which supplied the means for
which the idea expressed was identified.' 7 Hence, the practical diffi-
culty in the enforcement and protection of such ideas is somewhat over-
come by this tangible form requirement.
However, the tangible form requirement has since been rejected
by the great weight of authority.' It is sufficient if the means through
which the idea is expressed can be identified. 19 Yet a recent leading
1o Ligget & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 430, 194 N.E. 206, 210
(1935). Cited with approval in Belt v. Hamilton National Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689, 691
(D.C.D.C. 1952).
11 Cases cited supra n. 3 and 4.
12 Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F. 2d 556 (D.C. Mass. 1928).
13 Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
14 Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F. 2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see King Bros. Productions
Inc. v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) holding that
such taking is not "conversion" in the strict sense of the term and Herwitz v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 210 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) holding such taking is tort
commonly called plagiarism.
15 Comment, 24 S. Cal. L. Rev. 65 (1950).
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19.
17 Werkmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904); see supra,
n. 5.
18 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926); O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Bowen v. Yankee Network, 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass.
1942); Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930); Stone v. Ligget & Meyers
Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 210 (1940); Dane v. M & H Co., 136
U.S.P.Q. 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); 18 C.J.S. Copyright § 8 (1939); Nimmer, Copy-
right, § 11.1 (Bender, 1964, Supp. 1970).
19 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907); Holmes v. Hurst,
174 U.S. 82 (1898); Belt v. Hamilton National Bank, supra n. 10.
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decision in this area has indicated that if conversational dialogue was
to be the subject matter of common law copyright, it would have to be
so identified by "prefatory words or inferred from circumstances in
which the dialogue took place." 20 The reasoning has been criticized
by 21 some authorities.
Another element in determining the subject of common law copy-
right is the requirement that the idea expressed be concrete.2 2 This
is a converse restatement of the fundamental concept that mere ideas
are not the proper subject matter of common law copyright because
ideas are "free as air." 23 "Concrete" is the opposite of "abstract" and
synonymous with "tangible." 24 Hence, the confusion arises again with
the tangible form requirement. (Note that if the expressed idea is con-
crete, it should be identifiable.) Some courts have held that oral state-
ments can be concrete. 25
A third element, arising from the basic definition of common law
copyright, is that the subject of the copyright must not be published. 2
There are two different views determining when publication occurs.2 7
One theory draws a distinction between a general publication and a
limited publication holding that a limited publication does not destroy
the common law copyright.28 The second theory holds that publication
does not occur unless there is a distribution of tangible copies of the
20 Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., supra n. 3.
21 Williams, The Protectibility of Spontaneous Oral Conversations Via Common Law
Copyright, 13 Idea 263 (1969); Nimmer, op. cit. supra n. 18.
22 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Sloan v. Mud Prod-
ucts, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Okla. 1953); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872);
Dane v. M & H Co., supra n. 18.
23 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 251 (1918); Holmes
v. Hurst, supra n. 19; Fendler v. Morosco, supra n. 18; Werkmeister v. American
Lithographic Co., supra n. 17.
24 Nimmer, op. cit. supra, n. 18.
25 Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1964) holding oral
statements in an interview are common law copyright; Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem v. Documentaries, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (S. Ct. 1964) holding
statements made in live radio broadcast are subject of common law copyright; Uni-
versal Film Mg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1914) holding common law
copyright in words expressed in play; Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., supra
n. 3, holding conversation may be common law copyright. See also Jenkins v. News
Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 219 N.Y.S. 196 (S. Ct. 1926); Davies v. Krasna, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (Cal. App. 1966); Dane v. M & H Co., supra n. 18; Comment, 52 Iowa L. Rev.
105 (1966).
26 See White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950) and cases cited therein.
27 Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App. 1969).
28 Nutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F. 2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1929); Werkmeister v. American Lithographic Co., supra n. 17.
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work. 20  Under either theory, it is clear that in the usual oral conver-
sation sense, a publication has not occurred.3 0
The fourth and final element of common law copyright is that the
work must be original. This requirement is derived from the fact that
copyright protection will be afforded only to authors.3 ' By definition
an author is a creator, originator of the work.32 It necessarily follows,
therefore, that the work must be original.33
While oral statements in themselves can be original,34 a unique
situation is presented with respect to conversation. Conversation in-
volves an interplay of ideas. One of the participants in the conversation
may make a statement. It is in itself original but is "triggered" or con-
tributed to by other statements (perhaps also original ones) made
by the other participants in the conversation.3 5 Because only the author,
the originator of the statement, can claim a copyright therein, perhaps
both or all of the participants in the conversation may claim ownership
as co-authors or joint inventors.
A joint work occurs where two or more people collaborate in de-
vising and putting into form the subject matter of the work in question. 36
It is not necessary that there be a preconceived common design,3 7 nor
that the contribution made by the parties be equal in quantity or qual-
ity. 3 8S Suggestions which assist in working out the main idea, or an in-
29 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
30 Oral delivery of letture does not constitute publication. McDearmott Commission
Co. v. Board of Trade, 146 F. 961 (8th Cir. 1906); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967
(No. 1,076) (C.C. Ohio 1849); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries
Unlimited Inc., supra n. 25. Therefore oral statements made in conversation will not
constitute publication.
31 Federal copyright law gives protection only to the author. 17 U.S.C. § 9. The
same is true in common law copyright. Supreme Records v. Decca Records, supra
n. 4; Gladys Music, Inc., v. Arch Music Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32 Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebr., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D.C. Nebr.
1944).
33 Originality is one of law in the first instance and if there is evidence to submit to
the jury then it is one of fact for jury. Stevens v. Continental Can Co., 308 F. 2d 100
(6th Cir. 1962); Silver v. Television City, Inc., 148 U.S.P.Q. 167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
34 See cases cited supra n. 25.
35 Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 279 N.Y.S. 2d 51, 59, 153 U.S.P.Q. 871, 875
(Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1967).
"Conversations . . . are inevitably the product of interaction between the par-
ties; they are not individual intellectual productions."
36 Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 72 F. 2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1934);
Shreckhise v. Ritchie, 67 F. Supp. 926 (D.C. Va. 1946); Bourne v. Jones, 114 F. Supp.
413 (S.D. Fla. 1951), aff'd 207 F. 2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897
(1953).
37 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140 F. 2d 266 (2d
Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. Inc., 161 F. 2d 406(2d Cir. 1946); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. Inc., 221 F. 2d 569
(2d Cir. 1955), modified on rehearing 223 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
3s Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. Inc., 221 F. 2d 569, supra
n. 37; DeLaski & Thropp v. Wm. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 F. 458 (N.J. 1914) aff'd 226
F. 941 (3rd Cir. 1915); Sweet Music Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/70
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (1)
dependent part thereof which contributes to the whole, make the work
joint.39 As long as the final work is the result of mutual counsel, mu-
tual suggestions, and mutual effort, it is a joint work. 40 During a con-
versation, it may very likely happen that the effect of "one suggesting
one thing and the other another" 4 1 may result in a whole expression
which would then be the subject of a joint common law copyright.
Further developing this principle of joint inventorship applied to
conversation, the following situations should be considered:
1.) Where both parties contribute original statements going
to the essence of the subject of the conversation, both are co-authors.
2.) Where the contributing parties' statements are not in them-
selves original, such statements cannot be the subject of copyright.
However, they can serve as stimuli42 to the other parties' original
statements, and both collaborating parties are joint authors.4 3
3.) The next situation occurs when both parties contribute
original statements, but one party's statements do not contribute
to or form the basis for the other party's statements in the con-
versation. This situation exists in patent law where one inventor's
contributions form the subject of one claim in the patent and the
other inventor's contributions form the subject of another claim
in the patent. In such case, both inventors are sole inventors and
the patent is not a joint invention.44 However, in copyright law,
the party contributing statements not going to the essence of the
conversation may nevertheless claim a copyright therein as a com-
posite work.45
Basically, a composite work occurs where the respective con-
tributions of each party are distinguishable, are capable of support-
ing a copyright in themselves and, the parties are not deemed
39 George v. Perkings, 1 F. 2d 978 (8th Cir. 1924); DeLaski & Thropp v. Wm. Thropp
& Sons Co., supra n. 38.
40 Multi-volume: 2 Rivise and Caesar, Interference Law and Practice, § 323 (1943).
41 Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1882).
42 Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 531,
537 (1968).
"Conversation is a media of expression of unique character. Because of its sev-
eral nature any conversational exchange necessarily reflects the various par-
ticipants thereto not only with respect to the direct contribution of each but also
insofar as each party acts as a catalyst in evoking the thoughts and expressions
of the other. The articulations of each are to some extent indelibly colored by
the intangible influence of the subjective responses engendered by the particular
other."
43 Nimmer, op. cit. supra, at § 74 (1970).
44 DeLaski & Thropp v. Wm. Thropp & Sons Co., supra n. 38.
45 An argument may be made at this time, that the publishing party has made suffi-
cient contribution to the work, as by arranging the work into a coherent format,
which will justify original authorship. The answer is that such argument will afford
no defense to the fact that the publishing party misappropriated the ideas of another.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F. 2d 893, 898 (8th Cir. 1946);
Nimmer on Copyright, § 44 (1970).
Jan. 1971
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joint authors.40 The notable difference between a composite work
and a joint work occurs in the rights which each author has in the
work. Unlike a joint work, a composite work cannot be published
or copyrighted without the consent of the other author.47
4.) The last situation which can exist during conversation re-
sults when one party's statements do not contribute to the essence
of the conversation and are not original. When this occurs, it
should be clear that the party who contributes nothing original or
worthwhile to the conversation will not be entitled to any copyright
contained therein. Such a situation should be easily detectible.
It is doubtful whether any meaningful conversation could exist in
these circumstances.
Public Policy Considerations
Another method which may be employed in determining if con-
versation may be the subject matter of common law copyright is to
ascertain the effect of public policy considerations on this matter.
The purpose of common law copyright is to encourage men of
creative ability to express their creativity by affording protection to
their creative expressions and guaranteeing to them the right of first
publication.48 The public will ultimately be benefited because they
will have a right to the author's works when such are published. Hence,
the purpose of common law copyright is complementary to federal copy-
right law which grants a limited monopoly to the author upon the prem-
ise that the public will be benefited from the author's labors when the
monopoly expires.49 This purpose is frustrated when the author re-
tains a perpetual monopoly of his expressions by refusing to divulge
them to the public.50
Constitutional considerations of this subject indicate that the first
amendment guarantee of the freedom of speech applies not only to
prohibitions of restraint on voluntary public expressions of ideas but
also extends to the concomitant freedom not to speak publicly.51 The
result of imposing the sanctions of the first amendment will thus pro-
tect the speaker's right of privacy. However, the predecessor to the
right of privacy was common law copyright.5 2 Today the right of privacy
46 Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, 242 F. 2d 266 (2d Cir. 1957); Markham v. A. E. Bor-
den Co., 206 F. 2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953). For distinctions between composite work andjoint work see also, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F. 2d 160
supra n. 37; Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., supra n. 37.
47 Yale University Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); King
Features Syndicate v. Boure, Register of Copyrights, 48 U.S.P.Q. 237 (D.D.C. 1940).
48 Holmes v. Hurst, supra n. 19; Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929);
Brunner v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W. 2d 643 (1943).
49 Fox Film Corp. v. Dozal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
50 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F. 2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967).
51 Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., supra n. 3; see also, Recent Developments,
67 Colum. L. Rev. 366 (1967).
52 Williams, op. cit. supra, n. 21.
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is well defined. Suffice it to say that where a well known person is
concerned,53 or where the matter deals with the public interest,51 the
right of privacy is substantially less than that afforded the ordinary
person.
Practical considerations dictate that the subject of this paper will
only arise in situations where a well known person is involved. In such
situations, common law copyright should not be used to guarantee the
right of privacy under first amendment freedom of speech considerations
because the right of privacy has been developed today under its own
law and this law should be controlling on the subject.
Conclusion
The foregoing may be summarized by concluding that a strict analy-
sis of the elements constituting common law copyright will not pre-
clude conversation from achieving a copyright status although public
policy considerations will. These two forces are not irreconcilable.
As noted above, in the four suggested possible modes of conversation
which can achieve common law copyright status, only one mode can
result in a copyright which belongs absolutely to only one party to the
conversation. It is submitted that the courts could readily distinguish
this conversational mode from the rest.
Two of the conversational modes suggested will result in co-author-
ship of the copyright. Co-authors of a literary work are considered
as tenants in common.55 A co-author cannot be liable for copyright in-
fringement.56 Although he may not assign the joint work, he can, never-
theless, grant non-exclusive licenses for it. 5 7 Upon granting a license,
the co-author is liable to the other joint owners of the work for their
ratable share.58 An accounting is imposed on the co-owner on the theory
of a constructive trust.59
The third mode of conversation, noted above, will result in a com-
posite work. Under the composite work theory, an implied trust is also
created for the benefit of the contributing authors.0 0 However, a com-
53 Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
54 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
55 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909 (2d Cir. 1921); Denker v. Twen-
tieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 10 N.Y. 2d 339, 223 N.Y.S. 2d 193 (1961).
56 Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F. 2d 41 (9th Cir. 1965).
57 Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. 2d 620 (9th Cir. 1944); Klein v. Beach, 232 F. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1916) aff'd 239 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1917).
58 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., supra n. 37; Crosney v. Ed-
ward Small Productions Inc., 52 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
59 Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., supra n. 37.
60 Quinn-Brown Pub. Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Atlantic
Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F. 2d 556 (D. Mass. 1928).
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posite work cannot be the subject of copyright unless the contributing
author gives his assent.6 1 It is therefore suggested that this consent be
implied from the very act, itself, of two people engaging in conver-
sation. If a party to the conversation did not wish his statements to
be used by the other parties, the burden would be placed on him to so
indicate his intention to the other parties. 2
The result would be an equitable one. The public would not be
denied the ultimate enjoyment of the work. Any assertions by the con-
tributing party relating to the right of privacy would be governed by
considerations other than common law copyright. However, the pub-
lishing party would be under a duty to account to the other parties,
thereby preventing unjust enrichment. The requirements of common
law copyright being met, the status of copyright would be afforded the
conversation.
61 See cases cited supra n. 45.
62 Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., supra n. 3, the suggestion made by the court
that the speaker who desired a common law copyright in his statements indicate so
by prefatory words may be more relevant in this context.
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